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YOICHIRo HAMABE*

Changing Antimonopoly Policy in

the Japanese Legal System-An
International Perspective
The Antimonopoly Act of 1947 (AMA)' is one of Japan's most important
laws impacting international business transactions. The AMA prohibits private
monopolization, cartels, and unfair business practices in order to promote fair
and free competition in the Japanese market, with an emphasis on the protection
of consumer interests.2
Unlike the antitrust laws of the United States, the AMA is a single unit of
comprehensive legislation. 3 It consists of thirteen chapters. The general rules are
set forth in chapter I of the AMA. Chapter II prohibits private monopolization and
unreasonable restraints of trade. Chapter II also imposes surcharges (kacho-kin),
which are calculated on the basis of the profits gained in violation of the AMA.
Chapter III regulates trade associations by prohibiting certain activities because
Japanese trade associations tend to restrict competition.4 The AMA also regulates
Note: The American Bar Association grants permission to reproduce this article, or a part thereof,
in any not-for-profit publication or handout provided such material acknowledges original publication
in this issue of The InternationalLawyer and includes the title of the article and the name of the
author.
*Visiting attorney, Masuda, Funai, Eifert & Mitchell, Ltd., Chicago, Illinois. The author is a
member of the Daini-Tokyo Bar Association. He received his LL.B. degree (1985) from Keio University, Tokyo, Japan, and his LL.M. degree (1992) from Indiana University School of Law, Bloomington, Indiana. The author would like to express his appreciation to Stephen M. Proctor and Steven
L. Katz, of Masuda, Funai, Eifert & Mitchell, Ltd., for their useful comments.
I. Shiteki Dokusen no Kinshi Oyobi Kosei Torihiki no Kakuho ni Kansuru Horitsu [The Antimonopoly and Fair Trade Maintenance Act], Law No. 54, 1947, as amended [hereinafter AMA].
2. Id. art. 1; see also SHOHEI SHIBATA ET AL., DOKUSENKINSHIHO No KAISETSU [COMMENTARY
OF ANTIMONOPOLY ACT] 2 (Taisei ed., 1993). This recently published book was authored by the
staff of the Japanese Fair Trade Commission (JFTC).
3. However, broadly speaking, Japanese antimonopoly laws may include The Subcontract Price
Delayed Payment Prevention Act, The Improper Premiums and Improper Presentation Prevention
Act, and other related laws or regulations. See Antimonopoly Regulation, ch. 9 Supplementary Laws,
in 5 DOING BUSINESS IN JAPAN pt. LX (Z. Kitagawa ed., 1992).
4. SHIHATA, supra note 2, at 18.
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certain monopolies (Chapter I-III); stockholdings, interlocking directorates,
mergers, and transfers of businesses (chapter IV); cooperative price hikes (chapter
IV-II); and unfair business practices (chapter V) by prohibiting certain conduct
and requiring reports to the Fair Trade Commission of Japan (JFTC) with regard
to specified activities.5 Chapter VI provides for various exceptions and exemptions, and chapter VII relates to indemnification of damages. This article focuses
on the recent amendments to the AMA regarding JFTC enforcement (chapter
6
VIII), litigation processes (chapter IX), and penal provisions (chapter X).
Before discussing recent trends regarding the AMA, three significant characteristics of the Japanese legal system should be noted. First, the number of attorneys
in Japan is relatively small,7 and private parties and companies rarely exercise
their rights in court by using attorneys.' Japanese people prefer to resolve conflict
through negotiation to the greatest extent possible. The Japanese legal system is
primarily enforced by administrative authorities. These bureaucrats have quasilegislative, quasi-judicial, and administrative powers. Although most of these
administrative officers are not lawyers, they broadly operate the Japanese legal
system.
Second, even though litigation occurs less often in Japan than in the United
States, the courts play a stable and important role in the Japanese legal system.
Japan adopted a continental or civil law system, where statutes, as opposed to
court precedent, supply the binding authority. However, in practice, Japanese
judges follow court precedents in most cases. As a result, legal practice in Japan
is very similar to that in common law countries like the United States. In a sense,
Japanese courts follow precedent more strictly than do American courts, which
sometimes appear to change their rules drastically. As a result of this attitude,
Japanese courts tend to sustain the more conservative logic or argument presented.
Third, in comparison to the American judicial system, the Japanese judicial
system has generally, although perhaps inadvertently, failed to protect consumers'
or other individuals' interests. Because jury trails, punitive damages, broad discovery, and high accessibility to lawyers do not exist in Japan, consumers or
other individuals in that country face a more difficult challenge when attempting

5. The JFTC is a national administrative agency established by the AMA. The JFTC is somewhat
similar to the Federal Trade Commission and Antitrust Division of the Justice Department in the
United States. However, the JFTC has broader quasi-legislative powers. MITSUO MATSUSHITA,
AMERIKA DOKUSENKINSHI-Ho [AMERICAN ANTITRUST LAWS] 31-32 (Univ. of Tokyo Press 1982);
WILBUR L. FUGATE, FOREIGN COMMERCE AND THE ANTITRUST LAWS § 16.13, at 510(4th ed. 1991).
6. Its thirteen chapters consist of chapters I, II, III, 111-II, IV, IV-II, V, VI, VII, VIII, IX,
IX-I (Miscellaneous), and X.
7. In Japan, very few individuals (only 600 to 700) are allowed to pass the Japanese bar exam
per year. See Elliott J. Hahn, An Overview of the Japanese Legal System, 5 Nw. J. INT'L L. &
BUS. 517,522-31 (1983) (describing why there are few Japanese lawyers); Legal ProfessionAdjusting
to Changing Status Quo, NIKKEI WEEKLY, Feb. 7, 1994.
8. JOHN 0. HALEY, INTRODUCTION: LEGAL VS. SOCIAL CONTROLS IN LAW AND SOCIETY IN
CONTEMPORARY JAPAN 1 (1988); Hahn, supra note 7, at 531-33.
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to cure a social problem through litigation than they do in the United States.
Although the challenge is not impossible, very few consumers or individuals
have been victorious in civil litigation against companies in such areas as product
liability and unfair competition. These three characteristics of the Japanese legal
system are relevant to any discussion of the AMA.
The United States recently requested that Japan step up its enforcement of the
AMA. The Structural Impediments Initiative (SII) between the United States and
Japan illuminated the necessity and importance of enhancing AMA enforcement. 9
While the mass media views recent trends toward enhancement of the antimonopoly policy as a response to U.S. and other international pressure, the JFTC has
stressed that the trend is not due to foreign pressure but rather to the reconsideration of the market system within Japan.'O Regardless of the impetus, the Japanese
government has recently attempted to improve enforcement of the AMA. In this
regard, part I of this article discusses recent trends for enhancement of Japanese
antimonopoly policy. Foreign companies will be able to enter the Japanese market
more easily through the enhancement of antimonopoly policy.
Even with the positive effects apparently caused by U.S. concerns, the enforcement of the AMA is far from perfect. There are some ambiguous but basic
concepts regarding the AMA of which a foreign company entering into a contract
with a Japanese party should be aware. Although this article cannot explain in
detail all conduct prohibited by the AMA," part II provides a basic overview
of several problems associated with the AMA. The AMA, like U.S. antitrust
law, prohibits international contracts containing unreasonable restraints of trade
or unfair business practices and requires certain international agreements to be
examined by the JFTC. 2 Those contracts deemed by the JFTC as violations of
the AMA may be subject to various sanctions. 3 In this regard, part II also discusses how the AMA may affect international business transactions and foreign
investment in Japan.
I. Recent Trends of the Antimonopoly Act
A.

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

Overall, the former Japanese cartel economy has been transformed into a highly
competitive market economy through antimonopoly policy efforts by the JFTC. 14
9. Mitsuo Matsushita, New Measures Aimed at Reducing Trade Barriers,in 2
(CCH) 99-036, at 100,036-37 (1991).
10. SHIBATA, supra note 2, introduction.

JAPAN BUSINESS

LAW GUIDE

11. See generally Antimonopoly Regulations, supra note 3, at LX;

MITSUO MATSUSHITA, INTRO-

DUCTION TO JAPANESE ANTIMONOPOLY LAW (Yuhikaku 1990); 1 JAPAN BUSINESS LAW GUIDE (CCH)

37-000, at 32,002 (1993); FUGATE, supra note 5; see also Steven Z. Szczepanski, Licensing
Operations in Japan, in 3 ECKSTROM'S LICENSING IN FOREIGN AND DOMESTIC OPERATIONS ch. 31
(1992).
12. AMA, supra note 1, art. 6.

13. Infra part I.C.
14. HIROSHI IYORI & AKINORI

UESUGI, THE ANTIMONOPOLY LAWS OF JAPAN

33, 40 n.91 (1983).
WINTER 1994
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However, since antimonopoly policy conflicts with other policies, the Japanese
government has not always emphasized the enforcement of antimonopoly laws. "
In particular, between 1953 and 1973, when the Japanese economy achieved
remarkable overall growth, the JFTC was extremely weak when dealing with
various business activities.16 For example, while the JFTC was making an effort
to control mergers to prevent private monopolization, the Ministry of International
Trade and Industry (MITI) was encouraging mergers to build up large companies
to compete with other countries. 17 While scholars and consumer groups supported
the antimonopoly policy, the business sectors resisted efforts to strengthen antimonopoly law enforcement.'" The group-oriented and cartel-minded mentality of
the Japanese people were probably contributing factors. 9
Weak enforcement of the antimonopoly policy also seemed to be connected
with the political situation in Japan. Since the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP)
administration was substantially supported by protected industries, the party did
not enforce a strong antimonopoly policy.20 The general public could not politically advocate the antimonopoly policy in general elections against the LDP
administration because the issue was too difficult, technical, and novel to understand. 2' As a result, the original AMA was substantially weakened through several
amendments before 1977. For example, strict restrictions on holding another
company's shares and prohibition of international cartels were repealed from the
original AMA under the LDP administration. 22
However, since monopolization and cartels caused inflation, Japan revived
the antimonopoly policy. In 1977, amendments to the AMA strengthened antimonopoly policy. 23 Since then, the antimonopoly policy has been gradually and
slowly strengthened. The MITI's lax policies with respect to cartels in some
15. Id. at 13-20.
16. See Mitsuo Matsushita, Recent and Future Developments in JapaneseAntitrust Law and
Enforcement, in INTERNATIONAL ANTITRUST LAW & POLICY, 1992 FORDHAM CORP. L. INST. 41,
44-46 (B. Hawk ed., 1993); Antimonopoly Regulation, supra note 3, § 1.02[2][d], IX 1-8.
17. In the Yahata-FujiMerger case, the JFTC's attempt to prevent the formation of monopolistic
big enterprise was futile. See MATSUO MATSUSHITA & THOMAS J. SCHOENBAUM, JAPANESE INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND INVESTMENT LAW 140 (Univ. of Tokyo Press 1989).
18. The 1957 Annual Report of the JFTC stated that few industries were without a cartel, and
that most prices were artificially influenced by a cartel. At that time, Japan was called "cartel island."
SHIGEKAZU IMAMURA, DOKUSENKINSHIHo NYUMON [INTRODUCTION TO ANTIMONOPOLY LAW], 24

(Yuhikaku 3d ed. 1992).
19. Wolfgang Pape, Gyosei Shido and the Antimonopoly Law, 15 LAW IN JAPAN 12, 13 (1982)
(citing S. Karashima, Gyoseishido to dokkinho ni tsuite no ichi shiken [An Opinion RegardingAdministrative Guideline and the AMA], 566 JURISTO 28 (1974)).
20. In 1955 the LDP became the ruling party, and up until 1993, Japanese industries grew under
the LDP administration.
21. One fear of the American type of strict enforcement of antitrust policy is that an efficient
market may not require a work force sufficient to retain the workers at large. Since Japan has always
kept its unemployment rate under 3 % by fully absorbing the Japanese work force, the majority of
people in Japan have not had a strong incentive to favor a change in antimonopoly policy.
22. IMAMURA, supra note 18, at 22.
23. Id. at 25; MATSUSHITA, supra note 11, at 4; FUGATE, supra note 5, § 16.13, at 509.
VOL. 28, NO. 4
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industries have been criticized. Consequently, many special statutes that allowed
cartels to flourish have been abolished.24
B.

AMENDMENTS TO THE ANTIMONOPOLY ACT

In part because of international criticism and a more domestic, consumer-oriented
movement, fair and appropriate enforcement of the AMA has been in demand in
today's Japan. According to the JFTC, the antimonopoly policy is now important
because (i) competition must be promoted even if business leaders may be reluctant
to compete with each other; (ii) demands based on advanced technology and consumer
choice can be effectively realized only through free and fair competition in the market
because many new businesses based on new ideas and technology can enter the
market; and (iii) the Japanese economy cannot isolate itself from international rules.25
The expansion of new market-entry opportunities will be an important policy,
not only for foreign companies, but also for domestic business enterprises. If lifetime
or long-term employment by the major companies erodes as predicted, and if the
new efficient distribution system eliminates intermediary brokers and other excessive
workers from the work force, those workers who are no longer employed in the
major companies or existing distribution lines should be given the opportunity to
enter the market with new business entities. The recent, long recession stimulated
Japanese employment by the use of various early retirement programs. Further, many
consumers are seeking more competitive prices with their new-found knowledge of
foreign prices in the United States and other countries. Increasing domestic employment and foreign competition may be the underlying stimuli changing Japanese
antimonopoly policy on the international level. Under these circumstances, the AMA
and its administrative guidelines have been amended in accordance
with the Japanese
26
government's promise to the United States in the SH.
The 1991 amendment to the AMA increased the surcharges, or administrative
fines, imposed on cartel participants to deprive them of any profit gained from
illegal cartel activities,27 from 0.5 percent to 2 percent, depending on the industry,

24. Japan had been allowing many cartels to be exempted from the AMA. Now the exempted
cartels are abolished, but some exempted systems still exist. IMAMURA, supra note 18, at 110-11;
see also infra notes 141-48 and accompanying text.
25.

SHIBATA,

supra note 2, at 4.

26. The Japanese government promised to take the following four steps to enhance AMA enforcement: (i) increase of surcharges, (ii) increase of criminal penalties, (iii) assistance to private plaintiffs
who sue for AMA violations, and (iv) formulation of new guidelines on distribution systems and
business practices. Matsushita, supra note 9, at 100,037.

27. Since criminal penalties and the recovery of damages by private parties were seldom used
and possessed very little deterrent value, an administrative fine would be useful. MATSUSHiTA, supra

note 11, at 52-53. However, this surcharge system is unique in that it is separate from criminal
fines. The government explains that the purpose and procedure for a surcharge are different from
criminal fines. IMAMURA, supra note 18, at 76. The JFTC has recently used surcharge payments
actively and this trend is expected to continue. Antimonopoly Regulation, supra note 3, § 3.06[4],
at IX 3-13.
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28
to 1percent to 6 percent, depending on the industry and the size of the company.
The surcharges are calculated on the basis of the total sales during an undue
restraint of trade or a substantial restraint of competition by a business association. 29 In addition, the 1992 amendment increased the maximum amount of criminal fines from 5 million yen to 100 million yen (approximately US$1 million)
for private monopolization or undue restraint of trade.3°
From time to time the JFTC announces various guidelines for application of
the AMA to clarify whether certain conduct is violative of the antimonopoly
policy. 31 In particular, on July 11, 1991, the JFTC announced the Antimonopoly
Act Guidelines Concerning Distribution Systems and Business Practices (Distribution Guidelines) after receiving many comments.32 In 1992, the JFTC also
established updated rules that limit the types of international contracts to be
been enacted, the next
reported.33 Now that many amendments of the AMA have
34
concern will be to increase enforcement of the law.

C.

STRICTER ENFORCEMENT

The trend towards strengthening the antimonopoly policy has recently appeared
not only in the legislative level, but also in the enforcement level. A violation
of the AMA may be challenged by civil, criminal, and administrative proceedings.
First, an injured party may seek civil damages against the violator because private
monopolization, undue restraint of trade, and unfair business practices may constitute torts or create unjust enrichment.35 Second, criminal penalties are available
28. SHIBATA, supra note 2, at 63-64; Akinori Yamada, Recent Development and FutureProspective ofJapanese Competition Policy, in INTERNATIONAL ANTITRUST LAW & POLICY, 1992 FORDHAM
CORP. L. INST. 91, 93-94 (B. Hawk ed., 1993).
29. AMA, supra note 1, art. 7-2.
30. SHIBATA, supra note 2, at 86-87. The original amendment bill attempted to increase criminal
fines to 300 million yen, but the LDP strongly resisted. Jimin "Atsuryoku "de Enki [LDP Pressured
to Postpone the Increase of Penalty), NIHONKEIZI-SHINBUN, int'l ed., Dec. 18, 1991, at 7 (one of
the major national newspapers in Japanese, hereinafter NIKKEI). U.S. Trade Representative Carla
Hills has said that the new fines are inadequate and urged tougher enforcement of the AMA. FUGATE,
supra note 5, at 103 n.45 (Supp. 1993).
31. For example, in 1993 the JFTC announced guidelines concerning finance-system reform to
prevent banks and securities companies from improperly influencing and using their power over
other companies. The new guidelines prohibit a parent company from forcing other companies to
transact with its subsidiaries. Kogaisha Torihiki Kyoyo wa han [Enforcement of Transaction with
Subsidiaries is Prohibited], NIKKEI, Apr. 2, 1993, at 7; see also FUGATE, supra note 5, § 16.13,
at 513 (introducing new guidelines issued in 1989) and 101-02 (Supp. 1993) (introducing new guidelines issued in 1991).
32. Matsushita, supra note 9, at 100,037-47; Richard L. Thurston, Japan-The Antimonopoly
Act and JapaneseFairTrade Commission Enforcement, 27 INT'L LAW. 533,536-37 (1993); SHIBATA,
supra 2, at 116.
33. Law Guide, supra note 11, 37-570, at 32,403; HIDETO ISHIDA, DOKKIN SEISAKU KYOKA
No NAMI Wo NoRIKIRU [OVERCOME THE WAVE OF THE ENHANCEMENT OF THE ANTIMONOPOLY
POLICY] 172, 172-74 (Chuokeizai-sha 1994).

34.

IMAMURA,

supra note 18, at i.

35. AMA, supra note 1, art. 25.
VOL. 28, NO. 4

JAPANESE ANTIMONOPOLY POLICY

909

for violations of various articles of the AMA.36 Third, the JFTC can institute
various administrative proceedings.
1. Civil Action
Civil action rarely succeeds against violators of the AMA. 37 Unless the JFTC
delivers a decision regarding conduct that has caused damage to a person, the
injured person may only pursue civil action based on general tort claims.38 Also,
since Japanese laws do not provide for punitive damages, treble damages, or
class-action suits, injured consumers or traders ordinarily have difficulty seeking
civil redress. Furthermore, consumers have an extremely difficult task to prove
damages were caused by price cartel activities.39 Since the AMA has no substantial
evidence provisions, even final JFTC adjudicated decisions do not bind courts
in civil lawsuits. 4' As a result, consumers have never won in civil actions for
damages premised upon a violation of the AMA. 4' For example, in Tsuruoka
Oil the consumer claimants established the defendant's liability in a high court.42
The defendants, twelve oil wholesalers who occupied about an 85 percent share
of the market, agreed to raise the price of oil during the oil crisis of 1973. The
plaintiffs, about 1,600 consumers who bought oil from retailers at large, brought
a tort claim for the damages calculated on the basis of the difference between
the prices at the end of 1972 and the price in 1973, which was allegedly unreasonably high due to the price cartel of the defendants. The Sendai High Court,

36. Id. arts. 89-100.
37. MATSUSHITA & SCHOENBAUM, supra note 17, at 140. The JFTC found only fifteen civil

cases as of 1991. See ISHIDA, supra note 33, at 53 (while about 600 private actions are brought per
year in the United States, only twenty cases have been brought during the more than forty-year
history of the AMA).
38. Arts. 709 and 719 ofMINPO (Civil Code), Law No. 89, 1896 (Japan), as amended [hereinafter
MINPO]; Minshu 26-9-1573 (Supreme Court, Nov. 16, 1972); Minshu 43-11-1259 (Supreme Court,
Dec. 8, 1989); see also Antimonopoly Regulation, supra note 3, § 11.03, at IX 11-6.
39. Proving the existence of a violation of the Antimonopoly Act is often problematic, especially
when the parties do not have a formal agreement. MATSUSHITA, supra note 11, at 43-46. In order
to protect simultaneous price raises, the 1977 amendment of the AMA adopted certain reporting
systems by which the JFTC can more effectively investigate such matters. MATSUSHITA, supra note
11, at 46.
40. Minshu 41-5-785 (Supreme Court, July 2, 1987); Minshu 43-11-1259 (Supreme Court, Dec.
8, 1989).
41. IMAMURA, supra note 18, at 184; SHIBATA, supra note 2, at 35; ISHIDA, supra note 33, at
53. However, in a rare case in 1993, the Osaka District Court granted a damage award in favor of
the plaintiff, who was an owner of a building, against a subsidiary of an elevator manufacturer on
the basis of a general tort involving a violation of the AMA. The building owner was prevented
from using the elevator due to the defendant's unfair transactions and tying arrangement in violation
of the AMA. ISHIDA, supra note 33, at 54.
42. Japan has trial courts (district courts), intermediate courts of appeals (high courts), and a
Supreme Court. A high court can determine facts to be litigated. See Hahn, supra note 7, at 533-36.
In this case, while the district court denied the defendant's liabilities, the high court granted the
damage award. 1147 HANJI 19; Minshu 43-11-1539 (Sendai High Court, Akita Branch, Mar. 26,
1985).
WINTER 1994
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Akita Branch, allowed the damage award based on the JFTC's recommendation.43
However, the Japanese Supreme Court reversed and denied liability by applying
the strict evidence rule in the civil action." The Court held that the plaintiffs
failed to prove that the defendants' price cartel caused the increase in price. The
Court reasoned that the plaintiff failed to prove that there was no effect on retail
oil prices caused by other factors, such as the continuing rise of oil prices, the
increase in demand, the MITI's administrative guidance to set the maximum
price, and the increase in various costs. 45 Most Japanese commentators, criticizing
the Court's assumption that the above factors would automatically raise retail
oil prices, 46 stated that the oil price was actually raised through the cartel.47
To ease the difficulty of proof, in 1991 the JFTC published guidelines to help
private parties access JFTC investigation materials to prove facts. 4 8 According
to these guidelines, plaintiffs can obtain certain documents and materials from
the JFTC49 and can also submit investigation materials to courts as evidence
through a request for the transmission of documents. 50 The JFTC's new guidelines
in support of civil actions should be carefully watched.'
Unlike civil antitrust actions in the United States, Japanese private actions are
still very limited. This limitation on private actions is caused not only by the
Japanese legal system's lack of effective measures such as treble damages, class
action litigation, and accessibility of attorneys, but also by a Japanese policy that
does not use civil action as a primary tool in enforcement of antimonopoly laws.52

43. In the Tsuruoka Oil case, the JFTC had issued a recommendation decision to eliminate a
price cartel, which the defendants accepted and complied with. The high court followed the JFTC's
decision. However, the Supreme Court stated that the JFTC's recommendation decision does not
bind courts in civil actions. Minshu 43-11-1259, 1270-78 (Supreme Court, Dec. 8, 1989).
44. Id. at 1270-78.
45. Id. at 1276-78.
46. If fair competition were permitted in the market, suppliers could not have automatically
raised the retail oil prices regardless of the factors indicated by the Court.
47. Masayuki Funada, Dokinho Shinketsu Hanrei Hyakusen [100 cases of the AMA], 110 BESsATsU JURuSUTo 249 (1991).
48. SHIBATA, supra note 2, at 287-88; ISHIDA, supra note 33, at 121-27.
49. Under these new guidelines, detailed information about a cartel bidding was disclosed in a
civil action brought by a resident of Saitama Prefecture. Shimei Gyoshakan no DangoJittai Shosaini
[DisclosedDetailed Information of Collusive Bidding among DesignatedCompanies], NIKKEI, Aug.
31, 1993, at 35; see infra notes 51, 58, and 64.
50. MINSOHO (Civil Procedure Code), Law No. 29, Apr. 21, 1890, as amended, art. 319.
51. In 1991 in the Saitama Doyokai (Saitama Saturday Association) case, residents of Saitama
Prefecture brought a damage claim against some construction dealers that were determined to be a
cartel by the JFTC prior to the lawsuit. SHIBATA, supra note 2, at 36; see also infra notes 58 and
64. Also, the purchasers of seals used by government agencies recently brought a civil action against
seal companies that had secret price arrangements. In this case, the price of seals was reduced from
Y9.8 per sheet to 43.9 per sheet by eliminating the cartel. Dango Haijode Hangaku Ikani [Half
Price by Eliminating the Cartel], NIKKEI, July 27, 1993, at 39.
52. Yamada, supra note 28, at 103 (emphasizing the reluctance of Japanese companies to bring
lawsuits).
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In this regard, civil action will only supplement antimonopoly policy.53 Civil
actions will be more widely used only after the adoption of more effective methods
to utilize civil lawsuits or the emergence of more civil precedents in the Japanese
litigation system.
Nevertheless, foreign companies victimized by the violations of the AMA may
seek civil redress against Japanese companies by using the new weapons provided
by the JFTC and by creating new precedents. For example, sixty-seven Japanese
companies received a demand letter from the United States to pay ¥ 1,106,442,513
(approximately US$10,000,000 at the time) plus attorneys' fees for cartel activities in the Atsugi Base case.54 Certainly, victimized foreign companies may pursue
civil actions based on tort claims in general, even without a JFTC decision.
Although a foreign company's ability to establish a tort claim in Japanese courts
is not clear, a civil claim based on the AMA may be used effectively by U.S.
companies. 5' Thus, even supplemental means can work as leverage to promote
Japanese antimonopoly policy.
2. CriminalAction
The AMA also provides criminal penalties for private monopolization, unreasonable restraint of trade, and trade association activities substantially restraining
competition. 56Fe
Few cri
criminal cases have been brought in recent years. In the
absence of a JFTC charge, no criminal action may be brought against an alleged
violator of the AMA. 57 Since the AMA does not clearly define all actions constituting violative conduct, the JFTC appears to refrain from using such a drastic
measure.
Prosecutors also appear to refrain from prosecuting violators of the AMA. In
Japan, criminal defendants are rarely found innocent in courts because prosecutors
53. MATSUSHITA, supra note 17, at 65.
54. Tsuyokino Bei, Baisho Seikyu Tsukoku [Aggressive U.S. Demands a Claimfor Damages],
NIKKEI, Mar. 17, 1994, at 14.
55. In tort claims, the victimized foreign company must show the causal relationship between
the violation of the AMA and its damages. For example, if a foreign company can show that it could
have definitely procured a public construction project but for the cartel of Japanese companies, the
foreign company may theoretically claim damages that were spent for the project against the companies
that participated in the cartel. However, if the foreign companies could not have procured the project
in any event because of other reasons than the cartel, the foreign companies would not have grounds
to claim damages despite the existence of the cartel. Because they are different from Japanese traders
or individuals, foreign companies may not be reluctant to sue for a violation of the AMA. Cf. ISHIDA,
supra note 33, at 121.
56. AMA, supra note 1, art. 89; MATSUSHITA, supra note 11, at 84; SHIBATA, supra note 2,
at 78-79.
57. AMA, supra note 1, art. 96. The Criminal Code of Japan also provides that a person who
colludes for the purpose of preventing determination of a fair price or to acquire an unjust gain in
public auction or bidding shall be punished with penal servitude for a period not exceeding two years
or a fine not exceeding 2.5 million yen. Art. 96-3 of KEIHO (Penal Code), Law No. 45, 1907, as
amended; see ISHIDA, supra note 33, at 178.
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refrain from prosecuting questionable cases." Only six claims against AMA
violators were filed with the public prosecutor's office by the JFTC in the 1980s,
and only five cases resulted in indictment.5 9 Regardless of the rigid selection of
cases, some defendants in the Oil Cartel case were found innocent. The court
reasoned that the defendants did not have criminal intent because they acted
within the constraints of the MITI's administrative guidance.6° This ruling demonstrates the difficulty of taking criminal action against AMA violators.
However, in 1990, the JFTC announced guidelines concerning criminal charges
against violators of the AMA. 6' When a violation is clear or egregious, the JFTC
will now make a criminal charge based on these guidelines. In 1991, the JFTC
brought the first such charge since the oil cartel case of 1974 against a cartel of
manufacturers of plastic wrap. 62 Also, in 1993, the JFTC brought a charge involving
secret price arrangements concerning the purchase of seals used by government
agencies.63 In addition, the JFTC may wish to avoid being suspected of failure to
charge because of political pressure, as in the Saitama Doyokai case. 6 Since the
JFTC announced that it will be active in making criminal charges, more criminal
sanctions are expected, at least in cases involving intentional violations of the AMA.
3. Administrative Action
In practice, administrative procedure is central in the enforcement of the AMA.
The JFTC is authorized to make (i) recommendation decisions,65 (ii) consent
decisions, 66 and (iii) formal decisions.67 These JFTC decisions are subject to
58. Consequently, more than 90% of criminal defendants are found guilty in Japan. In the Saitama
Doyokai case the JFTC did not charge suspected construction companies because the prosecutor's
office was reluctant to indict because of the difficulties of proving the case. Oshoku Kozo wo Tettei
Kaimei [Thorough Investigation of Bribery Structure], NIKKEI, Mar. 9, 1994, at 34; see also infra
note 64.
59. Yamada, supra note 28, at 102.
60. Keishu 38-4-1287 (Supreme Court, Feb. 24, 1984); Matsushita, supra note 16, at 61.
61. SHIBATA, supra note 2, at 84-85; Yamada, supra note 28, at 115.
62. Kotorii 8 Sha wo Kokuhatsu [JFTCFiled Criminal Charges Against 8 Companies], NIKKEI,
Nov. 7, 1991, at 35.
63. "Kigyo no Hanzai" ni Tsuyoi Shisei [Aggressive Action Against White Collar Crime by
Companies], NIKKEI, Feb. 25, 1993, at 3. [hereinafter Aggressive Action].
64. In the Saitama Doyokai case, a former minister of construction was arrested and indicted
for bribery from a major construction company that attempted to prevent the JFTC's criminal charge
for the suspected cartel. Since the construction companies were not actually charged by the JFTC
for suspected cartels, the JFTC was suspected of having surrendered to political pressure from the
minister of the construction, but the JFTC denies the suspicion. Nakamura Zen Kensetsu Daijin wo
Taiho [Arrested Nakamura, a Former Minister of Construction], NIKKEI, Mar. 12, 1994, at 1, 3;
Nakamura Zen Kensetsu Daijin wo Kiso [Indicted Nakamura, a Former Minister of Construction],
NIKKEI,

Apr. 2, 1994, at 1;

NIKKEI,

supra note 58.

65. If a respondent accepts the JFTC's recommendation, the JFTC may issue a "recommendation
decision" without resorting to an adjudicative procedure. AMA, supra note 1, art. 48; MATSUSHITA,
supra note 11, at 81-82.
66. AMA, supra note 1, art. 53-3; MATSUSHITA, supra note 11, at 82. If a respondent admits
the finding of facts and the application of law stated in the JFTC's complaint, and the JFTC considers
the respondent's proposal acceptable, the JFTC may issue a "consent decision," which is incorporated
with the proposal. Id.
67. AMA, supra note 1, art. 54.
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judicial review. 68 Also, the JFTC may issue warnings (keikoku) and notices (chui)
for relatively small violations, even if the JFTC does not commence formal
proceedings.69
The AMA is unique in that the JFTC has broad authority to enforce it. Indeed,
enforcement of the AMA relies heavily on the JFTC officers. For example, civil
action under the AMA cannot be taken without a JFTC decision, and criminal
action cannot be taken without a JFTC charge. The JFTC controls these administrative actions and has complete discretion to take such actions. Outside parties
do not have the right to initiate any action before the JFTC, but can only ask
the JFTC to take action. 70 If the JFTC fails to actively enforce the AMA, antimonopoly policy will be drastically weakened. Actually, the JFTC may have prevented some civil actions and criminal actions in the past, partly because other
policies have prevailed over the antimonopoly policy. 7'
However, now recommendations issued by the JFTC against violators are
dramatically increasing. While the JFTC issued recommendations in only seven
cases in 1989, it issued twenty-nine in 1992.72 The total amount of the administrative surcharges imposed in Japan in 1990 is quite large compared with the fines
imposed in the European Communities (EC) after the 1991 amendment of the
AMA. 73 The amount of surcharges imposed between April 1989 and September
1992 is one-and-a-half times greater than the total amount of surcharges imposed
between 1977 and 1988. 74 Also, the staff of the Investigation Division of the
JFTC increased from 129 in 1989 to 186 in 1993. 7' Accordingly, it is anticipated
that the JFTC will enforce the antimonopoly policy more strictly.76
68. MATSUSHITA, supra note 11, at 83. Also, the JFTC may apply for a temporary injunction
from the Tokyo High Court. AMA, supra note 1, art. 67.
69. IMAMURA, supra note 18, at 204-05; ISHIDA, supra note 33, at 22 (The number of chui is
fewer than 100 cases per year).
70. Minshu 26-9-1573 (Supreme Court, Nov. 16, 1972).

71.

IMAMURA,

supra note 18, at 194.

72. Aggressive Action, supra note 63.
73. Matsushita, supra note 16, at 60 (stating that the JFTC imposed fines of about 12,562 million
yen in Japan in 1990, while the EC imposed fines equivalent to about 7,908 million yen in European
countries in 1990).
74. The JFTC imposed surcharges of 18 billion yen on companies involved in 41 cases between
April 1989 and September 1992. Yamada, supra note 28, at 114.
75. SHIBATA, supra note 2, at 289. The JFTC had a staff of about 400 persons. MATSUSHITA
& SCHOENBAUM, supra note 17, at 141. Now, the JFTC has about 500 persons. SHIBATA, supra
note 2, at 289; see also infra note 124. However, the scale is still much smaller than that of the
Antitrust Division of the Justice Department and the Federal Trade Commission in the United States.
76. The numbers of cases in which the JFTC took actions are as follows:
Recommendation
Warning
Notice
Order of Surcharges
1988
6
65
17
3
1989
7
115
28
6
1990
22
60
85
11
1991
30
24
88
10
1992
34
21
17 (To 135 Companies)
1993
23 (To 406 Companies)
SHIBATA, supra note 2, at 281; Karuteru Kacho Saiko no 23 ken [23 Cases Imposed Surcharges on
Cartels, the Most in Record], NIKKEI, Apr. 1, 1994, at 5.
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D. RECENT RESPONSE OF PRIVATE COMPANIES

Given these changes, many companies have prepared compliance programs
to guide employees in avoiding violations of the AMA. 7 Also, some industry
associations, such as the National Bank Association Federation and Fair Trade
Conference of Medical Supplies Manufacturers, are preparing or have prepared
compliance manuals for the AMA.78 Compliance programs generally consist of
(i) the declaration of compliance with the AMA; (ii) the preparation of compliance
manuals for employees; (iii) employee training about the AMA; (iv) internal
systems and procedures to specific antimonopoly problems; and (v) internal systems to check and improve compliance programs in general. 9
In response to the JFTC's guidelines, each industry voluntarily reviews its
trade customs. However, public opinion seems an even greater impetus for companies to promote free competition policies. For example, some automobile companies have revised their distributorship contracts to eliminate both the requirement
that dealers consult with the manufacturer before engaging in transactions with
other manufacturers and the dealers' obligation of exclusive use of designated
repair parts." Consequently, the manner of determining prices is changing by
eliminating restrictive trade practices and customs.8' At the same time, the number
of cases involving consultation with the JFTC regarding the lawfulness of proposed trade association activities is increasing.82
Furthermore, since the long recession apparently forced Japanese people to
seek cheaper prices, many companies now provide their products more effectively, more efficiently, and at a lower cost. In addition, Japanese consumers
who have come to know the difference between foreign prices and domestic
prices tend to seek reasonable market prices. 83 These changes in the Japanese
marketplace will promote fair and free competition, induce each company to set
77. The JFTC's survey shows that about 80% of the companies that responded to the JFTC are
preparing or willing to prepare the AMA compliance program. SHIBATA, supra note 2, at 31.
78. Dokkinho Junshu Manyuaruno Shishin Zukuri [Preparingthe Guideline of the AMA Compliance Manual], NIKKEI, Jan. 17, 1992, at 7; Dokkinho no Tebikisho Sakusei [PreparedManualfor
the AMA], NIKKEI, Feb. 3, 1992, at 11.
79. SHIBATA, supra note 2, at 28.

80. Nissan Kosokukitei wo Minaoshi [Nissan Reviewing Noncompetition Clauses], NIKKEI, Oct.
24, 1991, at 1. The provision prohibiting distributors from dealing with other manufacturers' cars,
including foreign cars, was eliminated by the JFTC's guidance in 1979. However, whether a distributorship agreement would require distributors to consult with the principal before dealing with other
manufacturers' cars was not clear. In 1991 the JFTC made it clear that such a requirement is prohibited
by the Distribution Guidelines. Nevertheless, there are still foreign cars in the Japanese market.
Jotaro Yabe, Keiretsu Gaikokusha no Sannyu wo Sogai [Keiretsu Prevents Entry of Foreign Cars],
NIKKEI, Oct. 11, 1993, at 14.

81. Yasuuriten ni Shukka Teishi [Ceased Supply to Discount Stores], NIKKEI, July 22, 1993, at
1.
82. Matsushita, supra note 16, at 66. The JFTC annual report shows that the number of the
consultations increased from 540 in 1987 to 960 in 1991. Id.
83. ISHIDA, supra note 33, at 17-18; Yuragu Kakaku Keshohin no Jin [Swaying Prices: Battle
over Cosmetics], NIKKEI, Sept. 28, 1993, at 3 [hereinafter Swaying Prices].
VOL. 28, NO. 4

JAPANESE ANTIMONOPOLY POLICY

915

reasonable prices, and eliminate unreasonable restrictions on competition. At the
same time, retail price maintenance has become impractical for every product
from cameras and electronics to detergents and men's wear. The entry of foreign
companies, especially from southern and eastern Asian countries, has accelerated
this trend.
For example, the cosmetics industry insisted on face-to-face sales, claiming
that sales personnel must see the customer's skin and demonstrate each cosmetic
to provide the customer with proper service. The effect of the industry's demand
was to eliminate discount stores selling cosmetics at lower prices but without
personal service. 4 In 1990, Shiseido, a major cosmetics supplier, terminated a
supply agreement with and ceased selling cosmetics to Fujiyoshihonten (Fujiyoshi) for failure to sell the products with adequate explanation. Fujiyoshi brought
a lawsuit against Shiseido, and the Tokyo District Court ordered Shiseido to supply
the products to Fujiyoshi. The court held that the obligation to sell cosmetics
face-to-face had the effect of maintaining retail prices in possible violation of
the AMA. 5 Similarly, in 1993 Kawachiya filed a claim with the JFTC against
Shiseido and other cosmetic suppliers claiming that Shiseido and other suppliers
violated the AMA by ceasing business with Kawachiya, a discount store.16 Kawachiya asserted that its termination was illegal and void because such termination
was in retaliation for Kawachiya's discount activities and was therefore contrary
to the AMA. 7
Japanese suppliers will no longer be able to insist on de facto price maintenance
or distribution systems burdened by various trade customs. The AMA will play
an important role in stimulating fair and free competition and providing reasonable
prices in the Japanese market. Japanese people have paid more attention to antimonopoly policy because of recent developments in this area. Although unfair business practices may have arisen in the past from a lack of understanding of the
antimonopoly policy, various informational and educational opportunities will
promote a change in public understanding.
Promotion of antimonopoly policy will take a prominent place in Japanese
society based on the recent amendments, stricter enforcement, and general trends
of the AMA. As the Japanese government and many private companies come

84. The JFTC exempted cosmetics, detergents, medicines, and other goods from price competition, beginning in 1953, by granting manufacturers the right to enforce specific retail prices. Because
this exemption was indicated as one of the reasons for inflation in the Japanese market, the JFTC
rescinded those regulations in 1973. SHIBATA, supra note 2, at 230. Cosmetics manufacturers are
rarely found utilizing substantial discount prices in order to lure customers to purchase their products.
Instead, the cosmetics manufacturers send thousands of specialists to retail stores in order to advise
women on how to best use their products. David E. Sanger, Discounting FinallyMakes It to Japan,
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 11, 1993, at Cl.
85. Taimen Hanbai, Shiseido Gawaga Haiso [Shiseido Side Lost, Face to Face Distribution],
NIKKEI, Sept. 28, 1993, at 3 [hereinafter Shiseido Side Lost].
86. Swaying Prices, supra note 83, at 3.
87. Shiseido Side Lost, supra note 85, at 3.
WINTER 1994

916

THE INTERNATIONAL LAWYER

to understand that the antimonopoly policy is important and beneficial to Japanese
consumers as well as foreign investors, active amelioration and enforcement of
the AMA will continue. Due to Japanese domestic necessity and international
pressure, such enforcement would signal an unprecedented change. As a result,
more foreign companies should be able to enter the Japanese market. However,
some obstacles to achieving the desired result still require clearing. Part II of
this article explores some of these obstacles.
II. Legal Ambiguities and International
Issues in Japanese Antimonopoly Law
JFTC enforcement of the AMA is generally predictable and transparent"8 because the JFTC provides an unofficial consultation process in addition to many
regulations and guidelines. However, like the antitrust laws in the United States,
various ambiguities exist in basic areas of the law and in some of the JFTC's
guidelines. 9
Since Japanese courts have not issued as many decisions as courts in the United
States, just how the Japanese courts will deal with some important antimonopoly
issues remains to be seen. Although the AMA was patterned after the antitrust
laws of the United States in various respects, practices are somewhat different.
Indeed, these differences may have presented foreign parties with practical problems that may have affected investment decisions regarding Japan.
This section of the article explores four topics: the legal effect of a domestic
AMA violation (domestic legal problems); extraterritorial application of the AMA
(international legal problems); cartels in bidding (economic and political problems); and special features of the AMA (structural problems). Through the discussion, this section draws two primary conclusions. First, foreign companies will
benefit from better understanding of the Japanese antimonopoly laws. Second,
foreign demands, including U.S. demands, have been and will continue to be
beneficial to the enhancement of the antimonopoly policy.
A.

LEGAL EFFECT OF AN

AMA

VIOLATION

The first question, a domestic legal issue, is whether a contract clause that
violates the AMA is valid. The JFTC appears to take the position that such a
clause is invalid. 9° However, invalidation of a clause due to its violation of the
AMA is less likely in Japan than under antitrust laws in the United States. 9' This
88. K. Blake Thatcher, The Administrative Regulation of Technology Induction Contracts in
Japan, 8 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 197, 234 (1987).
89. The JFTC has established prior consultation systems, because some guidelines are still ambiguous. The United States and Japan, in INTERNATIONAL ANTITRUST LAW & POLICY, 1992 FORDHAM
CORP. L. INST. 107, 116 (B. Hawk ed., 1993).
90. SHIBATA, supra note 2, at 286.
91. MATSUSHITA, supra note 5, at 428.
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ambiguity may obscure the impact of the AMA in Japan. The Supreme Court
of Japan has held that a clause violating the AMA is not void per se because the
AMA does not require such drastic measures. 92 The clause may only be deemed
invalid if it is contrary to "the public order and good morals" under the Civil
Code of Japan. 93
The real issue is deciding what offends the public order and good morals.
According to an authoritative commentator, (i) a contract whose purpose is to
violate the AMA, such as a cartel agreement or a joint boycott agreement, should
be entirely invalid; (ii) certain clauses in violation of the AMA, such as improper
exclusive conditions and illegal restraints of resale prices, should be invalid and
unenforceable only with regard to the illegal portions before they are performed;
and (iii) once the illegal clause is voluntarily performed, no party can reverse
the outcome for violation of the AMA. 94 Thus, a party cannot seek restitution
after the contract has been performed. 95
While a violation of the AMA is determined primarily in terms of antimonopoly
policy, the validity in a private relationship should be considered together with
its contractual relationship and the fairness between the parties in the particular
transaction. When a new legal relationship is established and-people rely on it,
the law must protect such reliance by balancing it with antimonopoly policy.
Accordingly, a clause violating the AMA will not always be deemed invalid
between the parties.
To avoid any antimonopoly complications, a prospective party entering into
an international contract should be careful of Japanese antimonopoly policy.
Although the AMA only requires notification within thirty days from the date of
certain international contracts, 9 6 any party may contact the JFTC to seek unofficial
assurance of favorable treatment. 97 Even in a questionable case, if the JFTC has
issued negative clearance (certifying that the JFTC will not take action against
the transaction) the parties can engage in business activities without fear of antimonopoly issues. 98 Also, under the new Rules on Filing Notification of International
Agreements or Contracts of 1992, either party may submit an application for a
review of the contract prior to execution or within thirty days following execu-

92. Judgment of June 20, 1977, Saikosai [Supreme Court], 31 Minshu 502 (Japan).

93.
94.
95.

art. 90.
supra note 18, at 181.
MATSUSHITA, supra note 11, at 87.
MINPO

IMAMURA,

96. AMA, supra note 1, art. 6, para. 2.
97. The JFTC's unofficial consultation process may appear to be uncertain primarily due to the
ambiguities present in the AMA.
98. SHIBATA, supra note 2, at 121. This negative clearance is similar to a Business Review
Letter provided by the Antitrust Division of the Justice Department or an Advisory Opinion provided
by the Federal Trade Commission of the United States. Unlike a Business Review Letter, a negative
clearance issued appears to be a guarantee that it will not take legal action against the party. Even
so, problems arise when a third party claims damages against the protected party. MATSUSHITA,
supra note 5, at 38-40.
WINTER 1994

918

THE INTERNATIONAL LAWYER

tion. 99 Accordingly, in practice it is advisable to check antimonopoly issues before

finalization of contract negotiations.
Unfortunately, this ambiguity and technicality may prevent strict and straightforward enforcement of the AMA in business transactions at large. Neither Japanese companies nor foreign companies can automatically assert invalidity due
to the violation of the AMA. In the demand for the strengthening of Japanese
antimonopoly policy, this limitation is important because private companies may
still enter into transactions suspected of AMA violations. The AMA alone cannot
promote free competition and fully open the Japanese market.
B.

INDIRECT EXTRATERRITORIALITY

The second question relates to an international legal issue, the extraterritorial
application of the AMA. The AMA applies to transactions or trade within the
territory of Japan. If the contract is performed in Japan, it may be subject to
the AMA.'0° However, the JFTC and many Japanese commentators deny the
extraterritorial effect of the AMA, claiming that the AMA protects fair and free
competition only in the Japanese market.' 01 The JFTC exercises jurisdiction over
overseas businesses only indirectly by ordering the Japanese party to delete or
modify the relevant contractual provisions.'0 2
While a Japanese party may benefit from a JFTC order to revoke some restrictions, the foreign party does not have standing to take legal action against the
JFTC under the holding of the Supreme Court of Japan. In Novo Industri S.A.,
a Danish company, Novo Industri S.A. (Novo), filed a lawsuit against the JFTC
with the Tokyo High Court to quash the JFTC order requiring a Japanese distributor to delete a provision of exclusive dealing and noncompetition. 103 Generally,
if a Japanese respondent is dissatisfied with the JFTC's decision, the respondent
can file a lawsuit with the Tokyo High Court against the JFTC.'04 However, in
the Novo case, the Supreme Court denied Novo's standing, reasoning that a JFTC
recommendation was binding on the Japanese respondent party who had accepted

99. Simon Berger, Regional Developments: Pacific Basin, 27 INT'L LAW. 547 (1993).
100. The fact that an agreement was made outside Japanese territory does not immunize it from
Japanese jurisdiction.
101. In this regard, the JFTC will not agree with the position that U.S. antitrust law should govern
foreign enterprises if their conduct hampers U.S. exports by U.S. into Japan. MATSUSHITA, supra
note 16, at 75, 76. Therefore, the antimonopoly issues in Japan should be discussed under the AMA,
not under U.S. antitrust laws.

102. MATSUSHITA, supra note 5, at 282. Similarly, the United States FTC has suggested prudence
by the U.S. government in enforcing its antitrust laws against companies in foreign countries. Government-Business Mission to Japan Focuses on Urging Anticartel Enforcement, 62 Antitrust & Trade
Reg. Rep. (BNA) 522 (Apr. 16, 1992).
103. MATSUSHITA, supra note 11, at 72-74.
104. AMA, supra note 1, arts. 77, 85.
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the recommendation but was not binding on any third party, including Novo, a
foreign party.' 05
The Novo Court also stated that the Japanese party could not use the JFTC
recommendation as a defense to the foreign company's challenge for breach of
contract. 106 Under this holding, the Japanese party is bound by the JFTC decision,
and violation is punishable. If the Japanese party breaches the contractual provision in accordance with the JFTC decision, the Japanese party may be liable for
breach of contract. However, if the Japanese party can show that the relevant
provisions are contrary to the public order and good morals under the Civil
Code,' 07 the foreign party cannot claim breach of contract because the provisions
are null and void.
The Supreme Court holding in Novo seems to create a dilemma, because courts
may not be able to easily ignore the JFTC's decision as a defense to breach
of contract. However, this conflict may be unavoidable because the effects of
administrative law and private law can be separate. 108 Still, a clause in violation
of the AMA is likely to be unenforceable.'°9 Accordingly, the Japanese party
will not be liable for breach of contract regardless of the Novo decision.
In practice, in light of the unfairness to the foreign party, the JFTC usually
initiates a formal hearing in which both the Japanese party and the foreign party
are named respondents, instead of issuing a recommendation only to the Japanese
party." 0 However, in Komatsu-Bucyrus, when the JFTC attempted to serve a
representative of Bucyrus with a complaint, Bucyrus argued that the representative
did not have any authority to accept the service. Although a foreign company may
avoid the dispute, avoidance is not necessarily beneficial. If a foreign company has
substantial interests in any antimonopoly issue, it should not rely on the Japanese
party or the JFTC's action, but should instead be involved in the enforcement
process of the AMA.
Each foreign company may voluntarily attempt to break through some antimonopoly problems. For example, the Distribution Guidelines assume that Japanese "distributors have less bargaining power than manufacturers.""' However, this assumption is not necessarily accurate when foreign manufacturers are depending on
105. Judgment of Nov. 28, 1975 (Novo Industries v. JFTC), Saikosai [Supreme Court], 29 Minshu
1592 (Japan).
106. If the contract has a force majeure provision to cover governmental action, the Japanese
party is not obligated to comply with the provisions, and the foreign party cannot claim damages.
However, the Supreme Court held that the foreign party may be able to claim damages in general.
Id.

107.

MINPo

art. 90.

108. This ruling means that the contractual relationship between private parties and the relationship
between the government and a private party can be different. Kengo Ishii, Commentary on Novo
Case, 31 Hoso JIHO 1-149, 162 (1979).
109. See supra notes 90, 94 and accompanying text.
110. See, e.g., Komatsu-Bucyrus, 28 Shinketsushu 79 (JFTC Oct. 26, 1981); MATSUSHiTA, supra
note 11, at 74-76; IMAMURA, supra note 18, at 175.
111. Thurston, supra note 32, at 537.
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domestic wholesalers, suppliers, and retailers to penetrate the market.1 2 If a Japanese
distributor has more bargaining power than a foreign manufacturer when entering
a distributorship agreement, the manufacturer may be allowed to restrict some activities of the Japanese distributor. In this regard, a foreign manufacturer should consider
and apply Japanese antimonopoly policy, depending on the manufacturer's share in
the industry, the nature of the industry, and other factors related to bargaining power.
If a foreign company believes that there are justifiable reasons to sustain its position,
the company must be able to show them to the JFTC.
To ensure that the AMA functions fairly with respect to both Japanese and
foreign companies, foreign companies should follow the antimonopoly policy to
be procedurally protected in Japan. To this end, the JFTC should have powers
to regulate any party that does business or enters the market in Japan. For the
JFTC to have broad power to investigate and regulate international business
transactions, an international treaty may be needed to create mutual powers to
regulate international transactions fully in each party's territory." 3
C. CARTEL BIDDING

The third topic is cartel bidding (dango), especially in the construction industry.
This issue became hot because of recent bid-rigging scandals and the U.S. demand
in the SII."4 Several problems plague the construction industry that typify the
problems in enforcement of antimonopoly policies in Japan. Since many cases
of AMA violations involving construction companies have come to light," 5 the
JFTC announced guidelines concerning various activities of trade associations
for the construction industry in public bidding in 1984. 116 However, many construction companies did not cease cartel bidding" 7 due to the political and economic environment.

112. Id.
113. Dokkin Seisaku Kyocho He Nichibei Kyotei [Cooperationfor Antimonopoly Policy between
Japan and the U.S.], NIKKEI, Sept. 20, 1993, at 3 (reporting on the U.S. proposal to enter into a
bilateral agreement with Japan to allow for cooperation in the enforcement of antimonopoly policy);
Matsushita, supra note 16, at 76-78 (suggesting bilateral approach, trilateral approach, and multilateral
approach).
114. The U.S. government has been complaining about the unsavory ties between Japanese politicians and the construction industry, claiming such links unfairly shut U.S. contractors out of the
Japanese market. Jacob M. Schlesinger, JapaneseArrest Shimuzu Chairman in Bribery Probe, WALL
ST. J., Sept. 21, 1993, at A18.
115. Article 8 of the AMA prohibits trade association activities that substantially restrain competition. AMA, supra note 1, art. 8.
116. SHIBATA, supra note 2, at 205, 219.

117. For example, the Yokosuka U.S. Navy Base cartel case took place in 1988, and the Kaidokyo
case took place in 1989. Iwakazu Takahashi, Dokinho Shinketsu Hanrei Hyakusen [100 Cases of
the AMA], 110 BESSATSU JUlUSUTo 82, 83 (1991) (commenting on the KansaiAirport case). Also,
the JFTC found that sixty-five construction companies were involved in bid rigging public civil
works, and the JFTC issued surcharge payment orders amounting to 1 billion yen (approximately
US$8 miilion) to 43 firms. Yamada, supra note 28, at 97.
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Bidding among designated companies may be the first reason why many cartel
scandals occur in Japanese public-works bidding. In these projects, government
agencies designate a certain number of construction companies that can compete
for a project. This designation readily results in an oligopolistic situation. Also,
construction companies must submit voluminous project proposals to technical
officers for approval. As a result, only the company determined by the cartel to get
the project from the government can afford to prepare the necessary documents.
Construction companies believe they will suffer large losses without cartels.
If a company fails to obtain a particular project after preparing the necessary
documents, the company will likely lose its investments. As long as government
agencies have the power to decide various detailed matters, the bidding company
must spend a great deal of time preparing documents to meet the government
agency's demand, which may sometimes be unnecessary. Depending upon the
companies competing for a particular project, politicians may mediate the competition at the final stage. "' These cozy relationships among politicians, bureaucrats,
and big private companies tend to destroy free and fair competition.
Therefore, the market environment must change to eliminate cartel bidding
in several respects. The JFTC has stated that bidding should be adopted in general
competition, and that even if bidding among designated companies is used, fair
competition should be maintained. " 9 If certain companies are designated due to
technical necessity, the criteria for bidding should designate the companies allowed to participate in the bidding. Foreign companies should also be allowed
to participate in bidding to the extent possible. Moreover, government authority
must be limited to facilitate efficiency of the bidding process. All these factors
should be considered to promote fair and free competition in bidding.
In 1993, the revelation of widespread bid-rigging for public-works projects
helped to end the LDP's four-decade reign. The new coalition administration
promised to make efforts to improve the system of public-works bidding. Under
the new administration, for example, the Ministry of Construction (MOC) decided
to abolish the ranking system of construction companies for conditional bidding
in general and to adopt objective criteria to evaluate construction companies for
their qualification for public works. 2 0 Conditional bidding will be used not only
for national projects, but also for local projects in the range of ¥700,000,000

118. Fukumoto & Shimizu, Kokyo Koji Nyusatsuno Genbakara [Reportfrom the Scene of Bidding
in Public Project], NIKKEI, Apr. 9, 1993, at 13.
119. Kotorii Ippan Kyoso Nyusatsu Motomeru [JFTC Requests General Competition Bidding],
NIKKEI, Sept. 30, 1993, at 1.
120. The ranking system of construction companies was created for bidding in general to select
good companies to complete construction projects. For example, the Ministry of Construction placed
about thirty companies under rank A and about 130 companies under rank B in the area of general
public works. Only rank A companies may participate in big public works projects, which account
for more than 500 million yen (approximately US$5 million). KensetsukaishaKakuzuke Haishi [Repeal
Ranking Construction Companies], NIKKEI, Sept. 20, 1993, at 1, 3.
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(approximately US$6,400,000 at the time) or more.' 2 ' In the objective criteria,
achievements in foreign countries are also considered. 122 Also, the MOC is preparing countermeasures to promote transparency and competitiveness of bidding by
adopting an independent supervisor of bidding, eliminating the promotion of the
23
joint venture system that caused bid-rigging, and adopting stricter penalties. 1
In addition, the JFTC will have liaison conferences with other governmental
agencies to prevent bid-rigging for public-works projects. ,24
In this process, the government took the initiative, while civil and criminal
actions had little influence. 125 However, victimized foreign companies may pursue
26
civil action against Japanese construction companies that violated the AMA.'
Also, international criticism, including the U.S. demands, accelerated enforcement of the antimonopoly policy in general. In this regard, political foreign
demands can be beneficial to the improvement of antimonopoly enforcement in
Japan. Accordingly, the debate over antimonopoly policy enforcement in Japan
should be sustained as long as the demands are appropriate and consistent with
worldwide free and fair competition.
D.

SPECIAL FEATURES

The fourth topic relates to the structural features of the AMA compared to
foreign antitrust laws, particularly U.S. antitrust law. Some foreign investors
may feel adversely affected by the enforcement of the AMA because enforcement
may result in broad intervention by the JFTC.' 27 With the exception of some
ambiguity concerning the enforcement of the AMA, foreign investors should not
worry about undue restrictions. Since the JFTC enforces the AMA by way of
specific regulations and guidelines, foreign investors can rely on such regulations.' 28 Overall, prohibited trade practices under U.S. and Japanese law are
121. Jokentsuki Ippam Kyoso Nyusatsu, Todofuken nimo Donyu [PrefecturesAdopt Conditional
General Competition Bidding], NIKKEI, Oct. 16, 1993, at 1.

122. Id.
123. Nyusatsu Kanshi ni Daisansha Kikan [Third Party Institution Will Audit Bidding], NIKKEI,
Nov. 1, 1993, at 5 (reporting that the MOC is attempting to amend the related statutes for these

purposes).
124. Kotorii Dango Boshi he Taisei Kyoka [JFTC Strengthens Its Power to Prevent Cartels],

NIKKEI, Oct. 21, 1993, at 5. At the same time, the JFTC announced an increase in staff investigating
violations of the AMA. Id.
125. On the contrary, a former minister of the MOC under the LDP administration was suspected

of preventing the JFTC from imposing criminal charges against construction companies in the Saitama
Doyokai case. See supra notes 58 & 64.
126. See supra note 55. But see ISHIDA, supra note 33, at 47-51, 119-21, 128 (pointing out various
difficulties in private litigation under the Japanese civil litigation system).
127. Thurston, supra note 32, at 540.
128. For example, the Antimonopoly Guidelines Concerning Joint Research and Development,
issued in 1993, restrict various arrangements in joint research and development activities. However,
the JFTC clarified that it would not restrict business activities when the shares of the participants
in the industry are not more than 20% in total. SHIBATA, supranote 2, at 57. Accordingly, middle-sized
companies will not have to worry about this point.
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substantially similar, 129 even though actual commercial practices in each country
may be quite different.
However, the AMA takes different approaches in some areas. For example,
the AMA may be more restrictive of some business activities than are antitrust
laws in the United States. 130 The provisions concerning monopolistic situations
and stock acquisitions exceed remedies in the United States for monopolization. "'
The JFTC may take necessary action against an enterprise involved in a monopolistic situation, even if such a monopoly has been acquired by normal business
activity and no predatory intent or conduct has been found.' 32
Holding companies are another example of broad Japanese regulation. Many
countries, including the United States, permit holding companies. However, the
AMA prohibits holding companies, regardless of their impact on competition. 33
'
Since foreign companies sometimes utilize holding companies to establish businesses abroad, the JFTC gives some leeway to foreign companies so that the
company will not be regarded as a prohibited holding 34company when a foreign
holding company owns only one Japanese company. 1
Japan's rule of per se illegality of holding companies developed before World
War II when holding companies controlled large industrial combines (zaibatsu).1"
The business sector has repeatedly requested easing prohibitions against holding
companies. However, since grouping companies can be achieved through mutually holding shares, this request has not been very strong. 136 Recently, various
organizations have proposed amendment of the AMA to allow holding companies.' Due to the recent recession, many companies are now restructuring to
streamline their organizations. Also, Japanese company structure, where compa-

129. FUGATE, supra note 5, § 16.13, at 508; ISHIDA, supra note 33, at 2, 32.
130. In some areas, the United States and Japan have many different approaches. E.g., ISHIDA,
supra note 33, at 32.
131. FUGATE, supra note 5, § 16.13, at 509.
132. AMA, supra note 1, art. 8-4.
133. Id. art. 9. The JFTC may bring a lawsuit to have such incorporation declared null and void.
Id. art. 18; SHIBATA, supra note 2, at 183.
134. 5 DOING BUSINESS IN JAPAN, supra note 3, pt. IX, ch. 4, § 4.02. MATSUSHITA & SCHOENBAUM,

supra note 17, at 159.

135. "Enterprises from various fields belonged to a corporate family (e.g., 'Mitsui' or 'Sumitomo')
and were usually controlled by a holding company." MATSUSHITA, supra note 11, at 1; MATSUSHITA
& SCHOENBAUM, supra note 17, at 158.

136.

IMAMURA,

supra note 18, at 42.

137. In 1993 the Industry Structure Council of the MITI proposed this idea. Dokkinho-Rokiho
Minaoshi [Review of the AMA and Labor Standards Act], NIKKEI, June 16, 1993, at 1. In 1994
Keidanren (the Federation of Economic Organizations) proposed the same, and some European and
American companies are also requesting it. Mochikabukaisha Kaikin wo Teigen [ProposedRelease
of Holding Companies], NIKKEI, Mar. 15, 1994, at 5; MochikabukaishaKaikinron Saifujo [Advocate
for Release of Holding Companies Again], NIKKEI, Mar. 31, 1994, at 7. Both Keidanren and the
MITI actively requested that holding companies be allowed, but the JFTC continued to oppose holding
companies. Id.
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nies own shares in each other, is criticized as exclusive affiliation (keiretsu). 38
'
This closely structured network appears to exclude new business entities from
the market. If Japanese companies stop cross-holding shares and streamline organizations through holding companies, they may be able to reform themselves in
response to foreign demands. Advocates of holding companies also argue that
there is no reason to retain the prohibition against holding companies regardless
of their impact on competition. 39 Whether and when holding companies will be
permitted in Japan is uncertain, making this an issue of continued concern.
By contrast, the AMA differs from American antitrust laws in some areas.
For example, a variety of provisions and special statutes exempt certain activities
from application of the AMA.' 4° The AMA provides exemptions for natural
monopolies,' 41 activities based on the law concerning exemptions from the
AMA, 42
' the exercise of intellectual property rights, 41 3 certain activities of cooperatives,144 certain resale price maintenance contracts,1 45 depression cartels,'46 and
rationalization cartels.1 47 The JFTC is now reconsidering these exemptions and
broadening the types
of industries covered by the AMA under the full pressure
48
of competition. 1
Government agencies may resist the abolition of these exemptions due to the
resulting impact on existing domestic industries. However, the current trend
favors the elimination of such exemptions. For example, the MITI decided to
abolish all exemptions for cartels within the textile industry because each textile

138. In the first joint report on SII, the United States urged greater efforts to eliminate the keiretsu
system of Japanese companies; however, Japan pointed to significant antimonopolistic actions. FuGATE, supra note 5, § 16.13, at 102 (Supp. 1993); ISHIDA, supra note 33, at 27.
139. However, the Nikkei newspaper anticipates that even if a holding company is permitted, the
Japanese company structure, in which companies own each other's shares, will not change dramatically
because few companies can utilize a holding company effectively. Atsushi Suemura, Kaikindemo
Keiei Henkaku Susumazu [Even If Released Holding Company, No Reform of Business May Occur],
NIKKEI, July 11, 1993, at 39.
140. SHIBATA, supra note 2, at 221-25 (listing special statutes exempting certain activities from
the AMA as of January 1, 1993); MATSUSHITA, supra note 11, at 88-95.
141. AMA, supra note 1, art. 21.
142. Id. art. 22.
143. Id. art. 23.
144. Id. art. 24.
145. Id. art. 24-2.
146. Id. art. 24-3. Although the JFTC approved 21 depression cartels in 1975, the JFTC has not
approved further depression cartels since the one approved for the shipbuilding industry in 1988,
making it the last approval of the JFTC. SHIBATA, supra note 2, at 234.
147. AMA, supra note 1, art. 24-4.
148. IMAMURA, supra note 18, at 110, 111. The number of exempted cartels totaled 1,079 cases
as of the end of 1965, but the number decreased to 161 cases as of the end of January 1993. SHIBATA,
supra note 2, at 222, 235. However, other government agencies are still reluctant to reconsider the
exemptions to protect the current industries. Dokkinho Jogai Karuteru Shukusho [Decreasing Cartel
Exempted from the AMA], NIKKEI, Nov. 2, 1993, at 1 [hereinafter Decreasing Cartel];Karamawarisuru Dokkinho Kyoka [No Effect of Enhancement of the AMA], NIKKEI, Nov. 29, 1993, at 5.
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company was already prepared for the repeal of such exemptions. 149 The JFTC
is making efforts to abolish those exemptions, which the JFTC viewed as consistent with the basic policy of the new coalition administration of advocating consumer interests.I5 0 Accordingly, the AMA will probably fully cover most industries in the future. In this regard, foreign companies will have greater exposure
to the AMA, and foreign countries should pay careful attention to the process
to enhance the antimonopoly policy.
III. Conclusion
Enhancement of AMA enforcement is inevitable because "maintenance and
promotion of fair and free competition is an extremely important policy objective,
which not only serves the interests of the consumers but also increases new market
entry opportunities, including those of foreign companies.' ' 51 However, civil
actions or private parties will probably not play as central a role in the enforcement
of the AMA in Japan as do antitrust laws in the United States.
Although the birth of the new coalition administration in Japan is timely with
regard to enforcement of antimonopoly policy, dramatic and swift change cannot
be expected in this area. Also, the AMA alone cannot enforce the antimonopoly
policy due in part to the three significant characteristics of the Japanese legal
system: law enforcement by nonlawyer bureaucrats, a conservative judiciary,
and less protection through litigation. 152 In general, conservative views may continue to slow the trend of increased enforcement of the AMA. Of course, politicians, bureaucrats, and big companies will not easily give up their own power
and protected, cozy relationships.
However, the recent developments described in this article will accelerate
enhancement of Japanese antimonopoly policy. The environment surrounding
AMA enforcement has changed favorably. The JFTC must establish a steadfast
antimonopoly policy in the current favorable environment. The Japanese economy
cannot isolate itself from international trade, and international pressure has played
a significant role in this area. The first step in the process to enhance antimonopoly
policy enforcement is for American companies to understand and utilize Japanese
antimonopoly policy in an appropriate manner. Although some companies may
have attempted to avoid antimonopoly issues in Japan in the past, continued
inactivity may become an impediment to entry and success in the Japanese market.
When a foreign company has been victimized by a violation of the AMA, it may

149. Tsusansho Seni KaruteruZenpai [MITI Repeals All Cartel of Textile Industry], NIKKEI, Oct.
22, 1993, at 5.
150. Decreasing Cartel, supra note 148, at 1.
151. JOINT REPORT TO THE U.S.-JAPAN WORKING GROUP ON THE STRUCTURAL IMPEDIMENTS
INITIATIVE sec. IV-1 (June 28, 1990).
152. The United States and Japan, supra note 89, at 127 (Professor Matsushita's statement in the
panel discussion suggesting that the AMA may not be effective in preventing the keiretsu transactions).
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be advantageous for such a foreign company to test the Japanese court system
by seeking civil redress, despite a lack of precedent in this area.
Second, foreign countries, including the United States, should continue to
pressure Japan to improve free and fair competition in the Japanese market.' 53
Considering the current political situation, the Japanese people will have difficulty
changing AMA enforcement drastically through national elections or consumer
movements. 154 Foreign demands can be a source of reform to the Japanese domestic antimonopoly enforcement system, which in turn may impact international
business transactions. Under the Treaty of Friendship, Commerce, and Navigation between Japan and the United States, Japan is politically obligated to take
appropriate measures with a view to eliminating harmful effects upon commerce
by business practices that restrain competition, limit access to the market, or
foster monopolistic control. 55
' Accordingly, it is consistent with this treaty for
the United States government to demand stricter enforcement of the AMA. Since
the JFTC may not have adequate experience in this area as compared to United
States antitrust agencies, foreign assistance or new international agreements may
also be appropriate.
Changes in Japanese antimonopoly policy have revived the AMA in the Japanese legal system. The Japanese market has been closed, and Japanese trade
practices are often criticized. However, Japanese companies have merely pursued
economic success in an environment where antimonopoly policy was often ignored. Now that Japanese enforcement of the AMA is on the rise, more Japanese
people will see the benefits of antimonopoly policy. This increase in benefits
should, in turn, foster further enforcement of the AMA, and a concomitant decline
in foreign criticism of the Japanese market.

153. Nihonno Dokkin Seisaku Kyoka, Bei EC ga Sukuramu [The U.S. and EC Will Cooperate
for Enhancement of Japanese Antimonopoly Policy], NIKKEI, Oct. 12, 1993, at 2 (reporting that the
EC and the United States are going to cooperate and demand enhancement of the antimonopoly
policy in Japan).
154. Sanger, supra note 84, at CI (Mr. Fujisawa, the president of Fujiyoshi, commented, "we
need Gaiatsu," which means foreign pressure).
155. Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation, Apr. 2, 1953, U.S.-Japan, art. 18, 4
U.S.T. 2063, T.I.A.S. No. 2863.
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